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CHIEF JUSTICE SHEPHERD AND HIS TIMES*
ROBERT WATSON WINSTON

In a conversation relating to great American Judges I once heard
Dean Pound make this statement: "Of the three, or possibly four,
great American state Judges," he said, "North Carolina has contributed one-Ruffin the elder."
Why it is that relatively speaking North Carolina judges have
stood higher abroad than North Carolina lawyers would be an interesting study. It may be suggested that this is a rural commonwealth, having neither cities nor a metropolitan press, and that a
lawyer is dependent on both of these advantages to broadcast his
fame.
Passing by the obvious reply that neither the lack of cities, nor a
merely local press, dimmed the fame of such judges as Ruffin, Gaston and Pearson, we might call attention to lawyers of national
preeminence who resided in states quite as sparsely populated as
North Carolina. But after all must it not be said that the reason
this state has had judges of far famed recognition, but no such
lawyers is this: Her judges either before or after going on the
bench, made due preparation for their life work, her lawyers did
not; the former have been willing to undergo a severe mental
discipline; the latter have not.
Unless the lawyer burn the midnight oil, striving after a larger
vision of life--can he be called a great lawyer? If the sole aim of
a lawyer be to raise a laugh with a rustic crowd or to read his
triumph in the verdict of the twelve, will not his fame like the
borealis race flit ere you can point its place? The stump speaker
struts his little day and is forgotten, whereas a Webster, steeped in
* This address was delivered on December 2, 1924, on the occasion of the
presentation of the portrait of the late James E. Shepherd to the School of
Law of the University of North Carolina.
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the tragedy of Macbeth, immortalizes the Knapp murder trial and
is on every schoolboy's tongue; and a Clarence Darrow, filled with
the psychology of Freud and John Watson, sets a continent by the
ears and adds a new chapter to criminology. In a rough and tumble
fight before the jury I would have staked my last dollar on Cy
Watson, Rom Linney or Tom Argo against S. S. Prentiss, Ben
Butler or Tom Corwin; but should that forum-the forum of wit,
sarcasm and brilliancy-be the goal of a first rate lawyer? Whenever dash and repartee go up against scientific knowledge, is the
issue ever in doubt?
Just here it may be well to ask what has been the prevailing
thought on the subject of thorough preparation for the Bar among
cultivated Carolinians, even among the Trustees of this University.
Has it not been to laugh at and ridicule such preparation, to acclaim
"hard horse sense," to point to Abe Lincoln and other self-made
men who had no "schoolin'" at all? Indeed, is it not too true that
public men prophesy smooth things only to the people-oftentimes
maintaining themselves in office by appealing to ignorance and
prejudice?
In Gerrard Hall, when Dr. Wilmer recently declared that the
greatness of this University consists in the fact that her sons seek
culture, not for culture's sake but for service, did he imply that
culture is hurtful to service? If so, Rousseau was right-the arts
and sciences have retarded, not advanced civilization-and civilization is a flat failure. If the best in art and science, in literature and
religion is not to be sought after, what is to be the goal?
The sore spot in the history of North Carolina, was it not indifference to the higher things in literature and life? For example,
was not the spectacle of a backwoodsman like Phil Alston, with
vulgarity and ridicule, chasing the constructive statesman William
R. Davie off the stump and out of the state but too characteristic
of a rude, an over-heroic past? Fortunately the tide has now set in
the opposite direction-away from buffoonery and mediocrity, away
from retarding and vulgarizing self-satisfaction, away from cheap
claims to priority and superiority in apocryphal or trifling historical
incidents. Surely when the Trustees last summer established an
accredited three year law school it rejoiced everyone who feels that
North Carolina boys and girls are entitled to the best without going
elsewhere to get it.
And while I am on this branch of my subject, let me get all
that I have to say by way of criticism well out of my system. Per-

CHIEF JUSTICE SHEPHERD AND HIS TIMES
haps the lesson which James E. Shepherd's life teaches will then
stand forth in brighter colors. This being a day of straw ballots
and of rampant pragmatism, I have just now resolved myself into
a Literary Digest Bureau and made a tabulation of prominent Carolinians. My purpose among other things, was to find out where the
greatest Carolinians got their training, whether at home or abroad,
and to ascertain which training, native or foreign, had produced
the best results.
To avoid mistakes the subject was approached from several
angles; and though the experiment may be of little probative value,
it is interesting to say the least. Thus the net result shows that: A
large, a very large proportion of outstanding North Carolinianswas
educated abroad and not at home.
Is it an accident for example that the foremost North Carolina
judge was educated at Princeton; that the greatest forensic orator
and debater graduated at the same institution; that Davie, the
founder of the University, and four of her eight presidents were
educated out of the state? If this be an accident, then let us enlarge
the electorate; increase the straw balloting.
There have been twelve Chief Justices of our Court; four or
33 1/3% received the culture of Yale and Princeton. Of twentyfour U. S. Senators, seven or neaily a third were educated out of
the state. So, of the Governors, twelve out of forty-eight had foreign culture. Perhaps this test, mere office-holding, is not a fair
one; though it must be remembered that the Trustees of the University and members of the General Assembly are picked men, and that
the former have always chosen the University President and the
latter, till 1868, chose the Chief Justice. However, let us apply a
severer test, that of cultural excellence.
Lewis in his Great American Lawyer series, an eight volume
collection, selects only three North Carolina Iawyers-Ruffin, Gaston
and Pearson-all judges, by the way. Of this number, two had the
advantage of foreign culture. By way of curiosity, I next turned
to an edition of The South in the Building of the Nation-twelve
handsome leather bound volumes-recounting the achievements and
reproducing the work of each Southern state: in art, science, fiction,
oratory, politics, and social life. Not a scrap on any of these subjects did I find emanating from or credited to the state of North
Carolina. So again in Peele's Distinguished North Carolinians-a
work purporting to contain great utterances of great Carolinianssixteen persons are selected, nine of whom, or more than half, were
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educated elsewhere. The greatest constructive intellect perhaps in
the state's life, Walter H. Page, was trained at Johns Hopkins; a
circumstance to which his biographer, rightly or wrongly, ascribes
Page's career of usefulness.
Now as I have said, whether this data prove anything or nothing, I can not undertake to say, but it would seem to behoove the
man on the watch tower to inquire wherefore this inferiority complex; what was the reason for this disproportion of successful North
Carolinians educated out of the state, to those educated within the
state. Was it due to thin and scant courses of study; to a prevailing idea, for example, that anyone who chooses can be a lawyer;
that intensive training is a detriment to real success at the Bar; that
culture is an affectation, a waste of time and money? In my opinion,
such was the case. I am unable to conclude otherwise. In the past
our young men were rushed into life unprepared. In native talent,
in the essentials of true success, man for man, North Carolinians are
equal to the best; and, with proper training, will be surpassed by
none.
Some time ago a kinsman of mine was complaining of a young
friend of ours: "Why," said he, "that young fellow is quite beside
himself,. he has mortgaged his home to attend the Harvard law
school." Two years after this conversation, casually picking up a
North Carolina paper I saw that the deluded young man had already
made a fair start in life, had been elected to the State Senate.
There was a day when hard-times and the duty of remaining in
the old home cut short many a youthful career, a day which we
fellows, coming on just after the Civil War, do not easily forget.
Naturally, we early developed a sectional complex, and a sectional
complex is deadly to culture. But now that prosperity has supplanted poverty, there is no reason why this state shall not excel in
things of an ethical as in things of material value.
Indeed as a faithful straw ballot statistician, it is my duty to
report further: That since about 1900 when North Carolina found
herself, the disproportion of successffl Carolinians educated abroad
to those educated at home has greatly decreased. Whereas a few
years ago North Carolina was the tail end of illiteracy, the Rip Van
Winkle of states, today she has as bright a future as any one of the
sisterhood. Is it not inconceivable that a state whose former call on
fame was the silly remark-"What was it the Governor of North
Carolina said to the Governor of South Carolina?"-is the same
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state whose University today is President of the Association of
American Universities and whose pride and progress are the wonder
of a metropolitan press?
It must not be thought that I undervalue the self-made man, I
do not, I honor him. But I do decry the former tendency of
belittling the necessity of severe mental discipline. I frankly admit
that in rare instances broad culture may be self-acquired. Indeed
such was the case with the man whose portrait I now have the
pleasure and honor of presenting to this law school. And yet I
maintain that the life of James E. Shepherd fully illustrates the
truth of what I have undertaken to show, that, with or without a
college education, severe mental training and high ideals are the
cornerstone of genuine success.
Though the mental training which Chief Justice Shepherd underwent was neither in law schools nor college halls, but in the more
arduous school of adversity, penury and civil war, it was nonetheless genuine, illustrating, as we shall see, Juvenal's wise saying,
"Haud facile emergunt, quorum virtutibus obstat, res angusta domi."
Early left an orphan, an only brother killed at Gettysburg, his
father's estate dissipated by war, the care of a dependent sister
devolving upon him, nevertheless the undaunted lad faced life with
a high, a definite purpose. Whether as fifteen year old marker-boy
in Lee's army, as telegraph operator, earning a livelihood while he
pursued the study of the law, or as attorney, professor of law in
this University, and judge of the highest Court, he brought to his
daily task a thoroughness, a conscientiousness which is the essence
of culture.
When I first came to the Bar, lawyers had the habit of riding
the Circuit with the judge. In the early 80's, it was my privilege to
go the old Fifth District with Judge Shepherd; the Judge and I
riding behind a span of fine horses over the hills and to the courts
of Person, Granville, Vance and Franklin. Dies borealis, they were.'
The flavor of the Old South still lingered-its ease, its dignity. The
days of telephone, jazz and bobbed hair had not yet arrived. Fitting
into that good day like apples of gold in pictures of silver was the
sweet spirited man whom we now honor: in dignity of manner, in
strength of character, in accuracy of knowledge worthy to sit in
any court.
I fully agree with Governor Aycock, in his address on judge
Shepherd, that as a trial judge, Shepherd has had no superior. Like
Mansfield, judge Shepherd felt that it is the duty of a judge to make
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it disagreeable for a lawyer to talk nonsense. In his court business
was speedily dispatched, but without haste or brusqueness. To the
argument of really important points of law or evidence there was
no limit; but if the matter was unimportant or well established, the
Judge allowed no time to be wasted. If the examination of a
witness were conducted to make a grandstand play or to kill time,
the Judge's prompt and decisive: "Proceed-proceed" had the
desired effect; the lawyers soon understanding that a real judge was
on the bench. Of Judge Shepherd as a Superior Court judge, this
must be said, he never hastened home, leaving a congested docket
behind for some more conscientious judge to clear. As a Supreme
Court judge also, I concur in Aycock's estimate of him, that opinions
more carefully considered or better prepared have not been handed
down by our Court.
Judge Shepherd was not an ex-tempore or ready man, on the
contrary he was a full, a patient, a profound man. If a question was
suddenly sprung upon him, he would perhaps venture no opinion
until he could investigate and go to the bottom of the matter. It
has been said, "Beware of the man of one book." Indeed one great
book, thoroughly digested, who can estimate its value! Such book
to Judge Shepherd was White and Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity
-to which must be added Smith's Leading Cases.' In these storehouses of knowledge, being great opinions of great English and
American courts, Judge Shepherd found the taproot of modern
jurisprudence; to them he constantly referred as the starting point
of an investigation.
The success of such a man was no accident, it was based on
merit, on work faithfully performed. Labor itself being a pleasure,
to him the study of law was more inviting than society, clubs, games
or other forms of amusement. Indeed it must be said of Judge
Shepherd that, like most accurate thinkers, he was a lonesome man.
In the preparation of an opinion he would study the record with
care, digest the facts, re-writing the salient points in his own words;
he would next scan the briefs, read and array the authorities, making
notes as he went along. Then, laying aside records, briefs, notes and
authorities, he would think the matter through-for days, weeks,
finally incorporating it into a well fixed system. At this point the
task of most judges would have ended, but not so with Judge
'White and Tudor's Leading Cases in Equity and Smith's Leading Cases
(fully annotated and edited) were the precursors of the modern "case system" and were a vade inecum in their day.
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Shepherd, he was now but beginning his labors. Seeking out a
brother lawyer or judge, these two, on their tramps through the
silent forest, would in Bacon's phrase toss the thought to and fro
in the air, even as the husbandman tosseth the hay to dry and sweeten
it. And how delightful were such occasions. What a wealth of
learning the Chief Justice had, without pedantry, dogmatism or selfassertiveness. And so modest and simple withal, so truly great.
One such occasion had an amusing ending. The case of Barbee
v. Barbee2 was before the Supreme Court. The point was this, can
the recital in a deed of the payment of a certain consideration be
contradicted by parol-that is to say, is such recital contractual or
merely evidential. It so happened that during a term of Wake
Superior Court over which I presided, Judge Shepherd was writing
the opinion in the case and the Judge and I had many a conference
over Barbee v. Barbee. Now it also chanced that at that time the
Chief Justice of a certain Canadian Province, a venerable whitehaired man, was likewise in Raleigh on a visit. So one evening
Judge Shepherd knocked at my door and suggested that we call and
pay our respects to our distinguished Canadian brother. I knew in
a flash what was up, Judge Shepherd was going to try out Barbee v.
Barbee on that innocent Canadian. And sure enough he did. We
had hardly seated ourselves when the Judge began: "We are much
perplexed, your Lordship, about a new doctrine of equity," said
Judge Shepherd, proceeding to elaborate the point. As we held our
breath awaiting the reply, this was the dear old gentleman's contribution, couched in velvet words: "If there be doubt about the
question, why not submit it to the Supreme Court of the United
States ?"
I have referred to Judge Shepherd's work as a system of equity,
a doctrine of law. And such it was. A system, not a detached
fragment; a doctrine, not a mere dictum. In this way and in no
other could his analytical mind operate. To him law was more
than a set of rules. Law was unity-it implied totality. In nature
this unity, this totality, exists and is called the law of nature. Why
does not the same principle hold good in human affairs? Municipal
law is not therefore to be thought of as something superimposed,
something from without, but as something within. The unity of all
'Barbee v. Barbee (1891) 108 N. C. 581, 13 S. E. 215 (affirmed 109 N. C
299, 13 S. E. 792).
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differences in things of the same class, this is what is meant by law.
In a word, law is not a mechanism but an organism; it grows, and
develops, but is always true to type, true to species.
Because Judge Shepherd's mind worked in this way, from within
a subject out, and not from without in, he could not abide individual
cases-mere photographic views of life. For example, he was never
interested in the law of torts with its uncertainties and variations,
or in rules of practice and procedure, or indeed in any subject
incapable of categorization. Little "pints" of law, discretionary
rulings on the sufficiency of code pleadings, equally with trumpetblowing, experimental decisions to catch the populace, these were
for others, not for him. Code pleading, which someone likened to
one old woman scolding another old woman, made its appearance
the year Judge Shepherd came to the Bar. Displacing the certitude
of common law pleading and practice, it was especially distasteful
to the old lawyer.
I could never tell exactly how Judge Shepherd relished the
change from common law to code pleading, but from the zest with
which he used to tell a story on Chief Justice Smith and my father,
I concluded that he was in sympathy ,vith them. In a case in Martin
County about 1870, a defective complaint had been filed and the two
above named lawyers wished to file a demurrer, not "going to the
case," but to a matter of form. Now they thoroughly understood
the old common law demurrer with well-defined meaning and consequences, but the new code demurrer, resting so largely in the judge's
discretion and with direful results if he was against you, why that
was quite another matter. "So," said Judge Shepherd, "Smith and
Winston, in a great quandary, put their heads together, finally coming into court and cautiously announcing: 'Your Honor please, we
desire to file this paper: a plea in the nature of a demurrer.'"
When Shepherd was transferred by election from the Superior
to the Supreme Bench, the spirit of conservatism which had characterized North Carolina courts from the beginning was dominant.
In 1889 the old order was in full swing. W. N. H. Smith was
Chief Justice, Gen. Scales was Governor, Vance and Ransom Senators, and nearly all congressional seats were filled by Confederate
soldiers. In this goodly company Shepherd was at home. More
diligent, more painstaking, and with a larger concept of the law
than his fellows--except the learned Chief Justice Smith-Shepherd
was a high priest in the conservative temple. Indeed of him it must
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be said, he belonged to what Prof. Stephenson calls the historical,
analytical school of judges, who agree with Bacon that the province
of the judge is dicere not dare.
Such men find it difficult to concede a spark of honesty to judges
of the opposite school, who contend that courts have no power to
set aside an act of the Legislature. The pet contention of the "toughminded" judge, that courts should have no will of their own, but
should ascertain and follow the will of the people, what is called the
mores; such a doctrine, to the "tender-minded" judge, is downright
treason to first principles.
Taking Ruffin as his model, Shepherd's task was to continue the
comprehensive system of equity and the well-establish law of real
property, contracts and negotiable instruments, for which North
Carolina had been so justly famous. To Ruffin, hard cases had not
been quicksands of the law; in the golden era of our judicial life,
individual cases had yielded to the greater whole; so in his day
Shepherd determined to hold the rudder true, regardless of consequences. No sooner had he taken a seat on our highest bench than
he sounded the keynote of his judicial career, adherence to fixed
principles, stability and certitude in the utterances of courts. Said
he, in the Moffitt case :3 "We have gone far enough in admitting
word of mouth evidence to contradict a written contract; wise rules
which are intended for the protection of the provident should not be
refined away for the relief of the negligent."
Judge Shepherd seldom dissented from his brethren, but when
he did dissent, as in Farthingv. Dark4 and in the LeRoque case,5 the
profession felt that the dissenting opinion would some day become
law. It will be remembered that a nice principle of equity was
involved in the latter case: If an insolvent husband uses his own
funds to erect a dwelling on his wife's land, can the creditors follow
the money in the said land, that is, can the creditors attach a trust to
the estate of the wife and hold her to account, as a trustee ex-maleficio. Differing with the majority of the court, Judge Shepherd saw
no reason to the contrary, and the court finally adopted his dissent.
In cases like Starnes v. Hill 6-which stands out like a beacon
light-his analytical mind displayed its best qualities. Here he dis'Moffitt v. Maness (1889) 102 N. C. 457, 9 S. E. 399.
'Farthing v. Dark (1891) 109 N. C. 292, 13 S. E. 918 (reversed 111 N. C.
243, 16 S. E. 337).
'Thurber v. LaRoque (1890) 105 N. C. 301, 11 S. E. 460.
'Starns v. Hill (1893) 112 N. C. 1, 16 S. E. 1011.
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tinguished between a vested and a contingent remainder, applying
the abstruse but well defined Rule in Shelly's case. Running through
all his opinions indeed, from first to last word, one recognizes that
which the musician calls the motif. This, I understand to be golf
vernacular for "Keep your eye on the ball"; it is also the lesson
taught by my old schoolmaster James H. Homer; "If you are in
pursuit of a fox," he would tell the boys, "never stop to chase a
rabbit."
How well Judge Shepherd succeeded in maintaining a system of
jurisprudence suitable to the needs of the times, depends upon the
point of view. The conservative recognizes in Judge Shepherd's
concept of law the only security of liberty and property-the endur.
ing foundation of the Republic; the radical, on the other hand, calls
him a reactionary and hails the coming of a better day when the
people will not only make but interpret the laws. But neither conservative nor radical will deny that the principes which Judge
Shepherd stood for, were those of Henderson, Ruffin and Smith,
under which order was maintained and justice administered.
In 1894, when Chief Justice Shepherd was defeated by a combination of Populists and Republicans, the old order was passing
away to give place to the new. The day of the idealistic judge who
concurred with Hooker that law is the perfection of reason, her seat
the bosom of God, was soon to end; the time for testing and trying
out all things was come. As science had been changed from mere
ratiocination to experimentation, so law, cut loose from precedent,
should adjust itself to human needs from day to day. Whatever is,
is wrong, became the slogan of the radical members of the Supreme
Court, now divided 2-2 on disputed social and political issues, putting it up to a fifth judge to break the tie. Consciously or unconsciously, the doctrine of William James: "Try it out and see if it
will work"-the "Monte Carlo doctrine"-wvas supplanting idealistic
philosophy. Because of the conflict involved in this change, in 1902
when the position of Chief Justice was again to be filled by popular
election, Shepherd, though urged by friends to do so, refused to,
enter the race.
Of this "bread and butter" philosophy, of this thing that James
calls pragmatism, it must be said that it came with a crash upon
"tender-minded" judges like Shepherd, who had been taught to
regard the judicial office as a sacred affair. A political judge I What
could be worse! The first of the new order, the first of those "tough
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minded" individuals who had occupied the Supreme Bench was
Shepherd's predecessor, Chief Justice Merrimon. Merrimon's dissent in the Barksdale case7 may be said to mark the dividing line
between the old and the new in our juristic thought. Previous to
that dissent, education had been considered a luxury, a privilege of
the rich; thereafter, it was to be considered a necessity; the common
heritage of poor and rich alike.
"Public education is a public necessity, more necessary indeed
than jails, roads, electric lights or waterworks; no election is necessary to validate a bond issue for schools or schoolhouses; the children of North Carolina must be educated, no matter what the Constitution implies to the contrary." Silch in substance was Merrimon's
dissent. This utterance placed the welfare of the child above the
letter of the law; it breathed the breath of life into the Constitution.
Indeed so impressed was I, then a rash young Superior Court Judge,
that I rushed into the fray,--in the Bladen County' case-threw my
judicial cap in air, and overruled the entire Supreme Court; getting
myself highly praised-and thoroughly spanked-by the Court on
appeal! 8 Twenty years later, as is well known, in the Collie case,9
Barksdalelo itself was overruled.
If Shepherd could not follow Merrimon in blazing new trails, he
was quite unable to comprehend the views of that sociological,
politico-pragmatist, Chief Justice Walter Clark-who counted that
day lost when he did not prepare some bill enacting a dissent of his
into law or write an opinion overruling some hoary precedent. What
glory to Clark greater than overruling Ruffin in the Rockingham
will case; how gleefully he whetted his blade for the sacrifice, as, concurring in Connor's great opinion,overruling Hoke v. Henderson,"
he exclaimed: "There is no peculiar sacredness attaching to Hoke vs.
Henderson!" North Carolina has had but one image smasher.
The contrast indeed between Shepherd and Clark is nowhere
more clearly seen than in dealing with precedent. To Shepherd
precedent was grateful-to him the Constitution was as sacred as
to Marshall or Hamilton; on the other hand, Clark was never hap'Barksdale v. Comrs. (1885) 93 N. C. 472.
'Board of Education v. Cornrs. of Bladen County (1892) 111 N. C. 578, 16
S. E. 621.
'Collie v. Conrs. (1907) 145 N. C. 170.
"0Barksdale v. Comrs. (1885) 93 N. C. 472.
'Hoke v. Henderson (1833) 15 N. C. 1; overruled by Mial v. Ellington
(1903) 134 N. C. 131, 46 S. E. 961.
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pier than in destroying precedent: to him the Constitution was anything but a palladium of liberty; it was a device of the rich to enable
them to pocket and protect their ill-gotten gains, and the sooner
blotted out and a brand new one substituted, the better.
The struggle between the forces of progress and conservatism
was slow to develop in North Carolina, but when it came it came in
earnest, reversing the do-nothing policy of a century. Every department of state government was shaken to the center; the Supreme
Court itself, whenever Chief Justice Clark could dominate, becoming incubator for remedial legislation, adviser of progressive political
parties, defender and maintainer of radical propaganda. What cared
Clark, the Chief Justice, though his Court were more often overruled than affirmed, by the Supreme Court at Washington ;12 to be
overruled in a "progressive" cause was itself an honor.
If Shepherd lost out in this struggle, he went down without sacrifice of principle. A conservative to the last, it was due to him and
to other conservative judges that North Carolina escaped the unbaked
jurisprudence of certain northwestern states. Let us put ourselves
in Shepherd's place and ask: Are the principles of law fixed and certain? Shall we visualize an Ideal and strive to attain it, or shall we
each day try out something new? Are there Ultimates? Those who
lived before the philosophy of William James, answer there are;
those who have come on the stage since, say there are not. As in religion and politics, so in law, the" New advances, the Old recedes:
the conservatve and the radical each alike being necessary to maintain
the balance.
In his day, the conservative served his generation faithfully;
his quantitative tests did not fail. Even so in the new day, good
and wise sociological and ethical judges assure us that the method
they propose is the method of the great Chancellors, who, "without sacrificing uniformity and certainty, built up the system of
equity with constant appeal to the teachings of righteousness and

""Prior to the sixty-third Reports, no writ of error had gone from this
Court (North Carolina Supreme Court) to the Supreme Court at Washington.
Since then fifty-nine writs of error have been disposed of by said Court, with
the following results:
. 17
Dismissed ....................................................
. 20
.................................................
Affirmed ......
. 22
..................................
Reversed ...............................
59
Affirmances 47 percent of appeals." See Centennial Celebration Supreme Court
of North Carolina (1919) 176 N. C.788.
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conscience"; that this is the method by which the common law has
renewed itself, at the hands of great masters: the methods cf Marshall as well as Holmes, of Shepherd as well as Clark.
I have not undertaken to set down all the events of Judge Shepherd's useful life: Such as his services in the Constitutional Convention of 1875; or on the bench of Beaufort County; nor have I
spoken of his honored ancestry, of his kindness to young lawyers, of
the love he inspired in a few choice spirits, of the influence of his
life upon the state; nor his exhalted position at the Raleigh Bar
after retiring from the bench, when, without repining at defeat, he
gathered together a select clientele, became one of our foremost
lawyers, and, eschewing the tricks of shyster and demagogue, held
aloft the banner of a noble profession. This pleasant duty has been
performed by hands more cunning than mine: in the 158th volume
of North Carolina Reports, my then law partner, Charles B. Aycock
pays a just tribute to Judge Shepherd as husband and father, as man
and Christian.
In 1899, when the inspiring teacher and gentleman, John Manning, died, the -Trustees and Faculty of the University were desirous
that Judge Shepherd should succeed him as head of the Law School.
Indeed Dr. Manning and Judge Shepherd together, a few years
before, had conducted the school with marked success. The position of Dean-though it was not then called Dean-was accordingly tendered the Chief Justice, and during several months he took
the matter under consideration, hoping to accept. Finally with that
consideration for others so characteristic, the Chief Justice declined;
his first duty was to continue the practice until his son, Sylvester
Brown Shepherd, just come to the Bar, could establish himself.
Carrying out this arrangement Judge Shepherd and his son practiced
law in the city of Raleigh until the death of the Judge in 1910.
At the age of 64, in the delights of a home, made happy by the
love of, wife and son, with numerous grandchildren to bless and be
blessed by him, in the communion of the Church of his fathers, the
Chief Justice peacefully died, leaving to this Commonwealth an
example of the only true success-its foundation stone severe mental
discipline and lofty ideals.

